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3 January 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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3 January 1962

DAILY BRIEF

*Congo: The UN column advancing on Jadotville yesterday reportedly was within four miles of that city when orders were received from U Thant to halt all forward movement.

An actual cessation of UN military pressure in Katanga would increase the possibility that Tshombé, who has been urging a cease-fire and negotiations, might return to Elisabethville for talks today.

Reports are conflicting on Tshombé's present whereabouts and intents. He is known to be under pressure from extremist advisers to resort to a "scorched-earth" policy in the face of UN advances, and Katangan sabotage efforts have in fact increased.

The UN column moving toward Jadotville encountered only token resistance. Although Katangan demolition of both the road and rail bridges over the Lufira River held up the motorized elements, Indian troops crossed the river in rafts and continued the advance.

all Rhodesian and South African mercenaries fled the area between the Lufira River and Jadotville.

European mercenaries, unhappy over pay, are reluctant to fight UN forces.

Destruction of the Lufira and other bridges by Katangans has disrupted rail traffic within Katanga

for at least several months. Other recent sabotage has included the cutting of a number of power lines. This has forced the closing of the Union Miniere (UMHK) copper mines in Kipushi, and UMHK officials fear that the Kipushi mines may be lost forever unless power for pumps is restored within the next few days.

UMHK officials in Brussels indicated yesterday that they now are willing to send representatives to Leopoldville to discuss the plan to make foreign exchange payments to the central government. Heretofore, UMHK has maintained it could not do this without Tshombé's approval.

In Leopoldville, Adoula has finally recessed Parliament until March. The success of the UN military operation and Tshombé's flight from Elisabethville have enhanced the prestige of both Adoula and the US.

The Adoula government would like to move quickly to establish its authority in south Katanga while the situation is still fluid. It has opened an immigration office to control movement to and from Elisabethville, and reportedly plans to send twenty police and immigration officials to Elisabethville today. It has also proposed that Congo Army troops be sent to Elisabethville to take over control--at least symbolically--of that city from UN forces.

The Portuguese Government, meanwhile, is extremely concerned over the impact on Angola of the developments in Katanga. On 31 December Foreign Minister Nogueira told the US ambassador that the US should accept "some" responsibility for the UN's actions and their consequences.

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Yugoslavia: Tito implied in policy statements on 29 and 31 December, his first since returning from the USSR, that no startling results can be expected from his talks with Khrushchev.

Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies apparently are to remain generally unchanged, although Belgrade will make a greater effort to avoid offending the Soviet bloc. Tito's remarks about coordination with "other nonaligned" countries suggest "nonalignment" is to remain a cornerstone of Belgrade's foreign policy. Tito indicated, however, that Western sensitivities will not be a factor in Yugoslav policy making.

Most of Tito's remarks on both occasions were directed to domestic matters. Tito apparently is concerned lest the broad reorganization he ordered at last July's party plenum lose its momentum. Picking up themes accentuated at the plenum, he criticized party indiscipline and local nationalism in the constituent republics. As usual, Tito implied that these divisive domestic forces, especially among intellectual circles, were under influences which infiltrated from abroad, i. e., the West.

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USSR-Yugoslavia. The majority of the Yugoslav military apparently would view closer military ties to the USSR with "regret and apprehension."

A Yugoslav General Staff officer told the US army attaché that the "bitter and humiliating" experience which the Yugoslavs had with the Soviet military mission prior to 1948 could never be forgotten and would be a strong factor preventing close relations in the military field.

The staff officer said that Yugoslav purchase of Soviet military supplies in 1962 was a last resort, after failure of efforts to obtain such supplies from the West. These purchases included approximately 60 T-54 medium tanks, about 20 SU-100 assault guns, and some radar equipment. There are indications that the Yugoslavs are also attempting to procure Soviet surface-to-air missiles of the SA-2 type and MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters.

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NOTES

USSR-Poland: The Polish Navy received a submarine from the Soviet Union on 30 December, the first major naval unit to be received from the USSR in several years. This unit--of unknown type--brings the number of submarines in the Polish Navy to eight, of which six are coastal units and one is an old long-range unit. A Polish military delegation headed by Defense Minister Spychalsky made an extended visit to the USSR in December, possibly to lay the groundwork for the delivery of other Soviet military equipment to Poland. [redacted]

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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk's "state of the Kingdom" speech on 31 December suggests that he is swinging back from left toward center in his public attitudes toward the West and the bloc. Sihanouk acknowledged that Western and neutralist reservations regarding his proposal for an international guarantee of Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity make agreement "far off," and said that, if relations could be stabilized with Cambodia's neighbors, he could "patiently" await signature of such a guarantee. Where he has previously threatened to ask Peiping for military assistance, in this speech Sihanouk spoke appreciatively of US military aid and warned against showing "ingratitude" toward the US. [redacted]

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Portugal: The Portuguese Government has specified a deadline of 31 December 1963 for withdrawal of US forces personnel from the Azores if the negotiations currently in progress for renewal of the bases agreement fail. The Portuguese had previously said that the US may continue to use the bases temporarily, pending negotiation. Lisbon is using the bases issue to pressure the US to support the Portuguese position on colonial and other matters.

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*South Vietnam: Fighting was continuing early today between government forces and a Viet Cong unit in a fortified village about 45 miles southwest of Saigon. The unusually stiff resistance shown by the Communist unit, estimated at battalion size, could indicate a significant shift in tactics away from the customary practice of disengaging and fading away before superior forces. It would seem more likely, however, that the Viet Cong unit feared it was surrounded, or that it was trying to cover the escape of some particularly important Viet Cong figures. Five US helicopters were downed and three Americans were killed yesterday in the action which began when South Vietnamese Government forces launched the attack.

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